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Impact of a Higher Minimum Wage on 
Enrollment of SNAP 
By Victoria Perez-Zetune 
 
Abstract. This paper investigates the effect that 
minimum wage policy has on enrollment in public 
assistance programs, specifically the Supplemental 
Nutritional Assistance Program, SNAP. If raising 
the minimum wage decreases enrollment in SNAP, 
this could uncover a method to reduce spending 
without eliminating programs. Using a time-
demeaned model to account for fixed effects, I take 
advantage of the variation in the minimum wage in 
the 50 states between 1998 and 2014. I estimated 
that on average an increase in minimum wage in a 
prior year results in a decrease in SNAP 
participation by 3.95%.   
 
 
I. Introduction 
 Since 1939 the Fair Labor Standards Act 
established minimum wage policy to prevent 
erosion of consumer buying power by inflation and 
to ensure fair compensation for labor (Grossman). 
Proponents of raising the minimum wage argue that 
it reduces poverty and increases the standard of 
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living of low-income workers, while the opposition 
claims it has detrimental impacts on business, 
increases unemployment, and thus increases 
poverty. Various studies on the effect of minimum 
wage on unemployment have found either no 
impact or a small negative effect (Hoffman 2014; 
Sabia et al. 2012). An unexplored aspect of the 
consequences of a higher minimum wage is 
enrollment in public assistance programs, such as 
the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program, 
SNAP.     
 Previously named Food Stamps, SNAP is 
America’s safety net to prevent hunger and improve 
nutritional intake. In 2012, more than 46 million 
low-income people were enrolled in SNAP on a 
monthly basis. A household must be at or below 
130% of the poverty level according to federal 
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guidelines to qualify after deductions for monthly 
expenses including childcare, medical expenses, 
and housing (USDA). Evaluations of SNAP 
conclude that it successfully reduces poverty 
severity and improves health outcomes, and most 
full-time workers on minimum wage qualify for at 
least one public assistance program (Allegretto et al. 
2013; Tiehen et al. 2012). The low minimum wage 
in the United States has a great societal cost. How 
does an increase in minimum wage affect 
enrollment in SNAP? Reich and West thus far is the 
only study to provide causal analysis of the 
minimum wage and SNAP enrollment, and they 
found that a 10% minimum wage increase reduces 
enrollment between 2.4 and 3.2% and overall 
program expenditure by 1.9% (Reich and West 
2015). Establishing the relationship between the 
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minimum wage and public assistance enrollment 
contributes to the debate over raising the minimum 
wage.  
 The purpose of this paper is to establish 
further if a relationship between minimum wage 
and enrollment in SNAP exists. In the following 
section, I use a time-demeaned model to analyze the 
question, and the subsequent section will discuss the 
data collected. Section IV gives the evidence and 
results, and finally section V is the conclusion with 
a discussion of the findings and implication. 
II. Modeling 
 Does an increase in minimum wage decrease 
enrollment in SNAP? Taking advantage of variation 
in minimum wage laws at a state level, I will 
examine changes in minimum wage over time and 
the corresponding impact on enrollment in SNAP. 
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This would result in a balanced panel dataset, since 
the construction would be samples from the 
population over various years with the same units 
appearing in each time period. If enrollment falls as 
minimum wage rises, this provides evidence that an 
increase in minimum wage lowers total enrollment. 
With panel data, it is necessary to control for time-
constant unobserved features that could be 
correlated with the explanatory variables in the 
model. A fixed effect transformation eliminates 
time-constant characteristics specific to individual 
states, such as geography or more importantly the 
impact of unobservable cultural attitudes towards 
public assistance programs that could affect 
enrollment. As seen below, a model that varies over 
time and category, state in this case, can be 
averaged over time for each state. By subtracting 
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the original model from the averaged, the result is a 
time-demeaned equation that has eliminated the 
fixed effect, the unobserved time-constant 
characteristics denoted by ai. 
Original equation:𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Averaged equation over time:𝑦𝑦� = 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝚤𝚤� + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝚤𝚤�  
Difference: 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦� = 𝛽𝛽1(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝚤𝚤�) + (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) +(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝚤𝚤� ) 
Time-demeaned: ?̈?𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1?̈?𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ?̈?𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 Using a fixed effect transformation, I am not 
concerned with variation among states that do not 
depend on time. If a state has a change in minimum 
wage, a dummy variable will capture this to see if 
the impact of the rise in minimum wage had an 
effect on enrollment that year. I will add a lag of 
this minimum wage dummy variable because the 
impacts of policies typically do not have an 
immediate effect. Other necessary explanatory 
variables that I must include in my model are 
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variables that impact enrollment in SNAP that 
change over time, such as unemployment. 
Qualification to participate in SNAP depends on 
household income and the number of individuals in 
a household. If unemployment were to rise, 
household income would fall and enrollment in 
public assistance programs would increase. Another 
variable is population growth since a higher 
population would lead to a greater likelihood for 
more people to qualify for SNAP. Race and 
ethnicity should also be included in the model to 
account for demographic changes over time in 
different states. Finally, a time variable is necessary 
to capture changes in enrollment that occur due to 
time.  This would result in the following time-
demeaning model: 
10 
 log(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛿𝛿0𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿1𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒̈ 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒?̈?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽2log (∆𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝̈ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽3𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏̈ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 + 𝜇𝜇 
 With the time-demeaning variables, an 
ordinary least squares regression can be estimated. 
If the estimated coefficient of the minimum wage or 
the estimated coefficient lag of minimum wage is 
statistically different from zero, this is evidence that 
minimum wage policy does affect enrollment in 
SNAP. If the two estimated coefficients are 
negative, this would be evidence indicating that a 
rise in minimum wage causes a decrease in 
enrollment, holding unemployment, population 
growth, and the percent of blacks in the state 
constant. If this were to be the estimated result, the 
null hypothesis would fail to be rejected, and the 
fact that minimum wage increases lead to a lower 
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enrollment in SNAP would be accepted as a causal 
relationship. Finding this result would further the 
question if minimum wage changes lower 
expenditure of public assistance programs due to 
the decrease in enrollment.  
 On the contrary, if the estimated coefficient 
of the minimum wage and the estimated coefficient 
of its lag are both statistically insignificant, the null 
would be rejected and lead to the conclusion that 
increases in the minimum wage result in no impact 
on enrollment in SNAP assuming that 
unemployment, population growth, and the percent 
of blacks in the state are unchanged. Similarly, 
finding statistical significance but positive 
coefficient estimates of the minimum wage and the 
estimated coefficient lag of the minimum wage 
would also lead to rejection of the null hypothesis 
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and give evidence that the opposite is true. Positive 
coefficient estimates would imply that a rise in 
minimum wage increases enrollment in SNAP. 
 Using this model is best because the 
minimum wage and enrollment in SNAP change 
over time and different states have their own wage 
legislation. Thus, the relationship between 
minimum wage policy and enrollment in public 
assistance programs can be seen both over time and 
in the different states. With panel data, the standard 
ordinary least squares regression does not make 
sense since unobservable, constant characteristics 
exist that are state specific. When only using two 
time periods, differencing can be implemented to 
eliminate such characteristics, but SNAP and 
minimum wage policy have existed for various 
years and it is preferable to take advantage of all 
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available data. Limiting the model to two years 
could influence the estimated coefficients because it 
could be a year when enrollment was abnormally 
high or low due to the time period. Since more than 
two years are being observed, a time-demeaning 
model is best.  
III. Data 
 An ideal data set for this model would have 
information for all years that both minimum wage 
policy was put into effect and food stamps were 
created. Minimum wage policy was created in 1938, 
but food stamps were not a national program until 
1974. Furthermore, in 1977 President Carter 
established eligibility requirements in the Food 
Stamps Act, so the years of 1974 to 1977 should be 
grouped to create a dummy variable in order to 
account for criteria changes in enrollment (USDA 
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2014). With data spanning 1974 to present day from 
all 50 states, I would collect the minimum wage of 
each state annually. SNAP enrollment is given as a 
monthly estimate, but I would want to know 
whether or not each person in the United States 
benefited from SNAP annually. I would want the 
exact unemployment rate for each state, including 
discouraged workers who are not measured since 
unemployment only counts individuals actively 
seeking a job. Additionally, demographic 
parameters for each state would be preferred over 
estimates. I would want to use exact population 
growth and the racial and ethnic composition of 
each state. Racial composition would be the actual 
percentage of African Americans in the state, and 
ethnic composition would be the actual percentage 
of Hispanics in the state. Lastly, I ideally would 
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include average household size because 
qualification for SNAP is based on income of the 
household, and a larger household income size has a 
greater likelihood of qualifying. Average household 
size could change over time at varying rates in 
different states. 
 I was unable to find data spanning all of the 
desired years; I was limited to 1998 to 2014. The 
United States Department of Agriculture Food and 
Nutrition Service provided enrollment in SNAP for 
each state as the average monthly participation. The 
U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division 
published the minimum wage for each state, 
excluding farming employment, from 1968 until 
2014. The minimum wage was given as a dollar 
value in normal terms. The Department of Labor 
also provided estimates for unemployment rate 
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between 2010 and 2014; prior years were found in 
statistical abstracts of the Census. Both the 
population growth and percent of the state 
population that is black were found in the Census or 
Current Population Survey. The black population 
was given as a percent of the total state population, 
but population growth I calculated by subtracting 
the current population with the prior years and 
taking the natural log. Below is a table with a 
summary of the data collected from 1998 to 2014 
and used in the model. I manipulated enrollment of 
SNAP by taking the natural log in order to interpret 
the changes as percent changes in enrollment.  
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   Figure 1: Data Summary Table  
Variable Mean Std Dev Min  Max 
Enrollment 593169.7 683886.5 22485 4349634 
Log(enrollment) 12.703 1.159 10.02 15.28 
Min Wage 6.09 1.27 1.6 9.32 
Min Wage dummy .3129 .4639 0 1 
Min Wage dummy 
lagged 
.3133 .4641 0 1 
Unemployment 
rate 5.818 2.012 2.2 13.5 
Log(popgrowth) 8.99 4.81 -12.438 13.749 
Black percent of pop 9.919 9.477 0.177 37.505 
 
 
The biggest limitation of my data was my 
inability to find accurate average household size per 
state and the Hispanic population. Average 
household size by state was only published for 2000 
and 2010. The amount of missing information did 
not allow me to include this variable in the model. 
A similar collection issue arose with Hispanic 
population due to changes in the Census. Major 
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changes in categories of race and ethnicity occurred 
in 2008 and 2010 leaving inaccuracy in 
measurements due to phrasing changes (Cohn 
2010). Also, historic data were only collected every 
decade so I had to begin my data set in 1998 when I 
would have liked to begin in 1974 with the national 
Food Stamps Act. Not being able to include the full 
time range and more importantly two explanatory 
variables that I believe are significant can cause 
omitted variable bias. 
Another limitation of my data is that as I 
mentioned unemployment only captures individuals 
actively seeking a job. Unemployment excludes 
discouraged workers, people who are not looking 
for a job due to the belief that there are no jobs 
available. Furthermore, unemployment measures 
people who have job searched in the last month and 
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do not have employment therefore “marginally 
attached workers” are not considered. “Marginally 
attached workers” are those who have attempted to 
find a job in the last year but not the past month 
(Chapman and Ettlinger 2004). Unemployment does 
not account for hours worked, so part-time workers 
who desire full-time positions are uncounted. 
Unemployment is a flawed measure in its ability to 
capture the economic situation of laborers 
accurately. Furthermore, Census data are collected 
through questionnaires mailed to households, and 
self-identification bias could occur for racial and 
ethnic categories. Also the data collected annually 
are estimates, not population parameters. Not 
having the ideal data, all desired variables, and the 
potential year span limits the validity and accuracy 
of my study.  
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IV. Evidence  
 Implementing a time-demeaning model with 
an ordinary least squares regression, the following 
model resulted in the estimation:  log�𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖̈ �  = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛿𝛿0 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖̈ +𝛿𝛿1𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝚤𝚤 𝑖𝑖−1̈+ 𝛽𝛽1𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖̈ + 𝛽𝛽2 log(∆𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝̈ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)+ 𝛽𝛽3𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖̈ + 𝛽𝛽4𝑦𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒̈ + 𝜇𝜇 
 
Figure 2: Coefficient estimate table 
 
 
 Surprised by the statistical insignificance of 
the coefficient estimate of black that had a p-value 
of .485, I plotted the residuals against black to 
Variable Coefficient Estimate 
Min dummy -.00794 
Min lag dummy* -.03948 
Unem* .04911 
Log(∆pop)* .00306 
%Black -.00095 
Year* .05977 
Constant -107.49 
* Denotes statistical significance at a 1% level 
21 
 
check if there was a pattern in the variance of the 
error term. When the variance in the error term is 
not constant, the problem of heteroskedasticity 
arises. Although heteroskedasticity does not impact 
the estimated coefficient value, statistical inference 
is not possible due to inaccurate p-values and t-
statistics. The scatterplot below shows the graphical 
result, and the variance appears to converge.  
Figure 3: Scatterplot 
 
In order to correct the standard errors, I ran the 
regression using robust standard errors. Although 
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the robust standard errors decreased the p-value on 
the coefficient estimate of black, the coefficient 
estimate remained statistically insignificant at a 5% 
level. There were no changes to the statistical 
significance of any of the estimated coefficients 
when using robust standard errors. 
 Given the estimated coefficients, I find that 
my null hypothesis, that increasing the minimum 
wage decreases enrollment in the Supplemental 
Nutritional Assistance Program, is upheld. The 
coefficient estimate on the dummy variable that 
equals one when the state experienced a rise in the 
minimum wage that year is not statistically different 
from zero, but the lagged dummy variable of the 
minimum wage has a statistically significant 
coefficient estimate. The coefficient estimate on the 
lagged dummy variable of minimum wage has a p-
23 
 
value of 0; therefore the coefficient estimate is 
statistically significant at a 99% confidence level. 
This provides very strong evidence that the 
minimum wage policy does effect enrollment in 
SNAP. On average, if in the prior year there is an 
increase in the minimum wage in a state, enrollment 
in SNAP decreases by 3.948%, holding 
unemployment, population growth, and the percent 
of the black population constant. This shows an 
increase in minimum wage results in a decrease in 
enrollment in SNAP, and lower enrollment in public 
assistance programs signify lower levels of 
spending without reducing program capacities or 
decreasing benefits. 
 The estimated model also found that on 
average when unemployment rises by one 
percentage point, enrollment in SNAP increases by 
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4.91% when other variables in the model are held 
constant. I expected the coefficient estimate of 
unemployment to be positive because higher levels 
of unemployment mean households have lower 
levels of income, and SNAP enrollment is based on 
household income. Holding everything included in 
the model constant, when population growth 
increases by 1%, enrollment in SNAP increases by 
0.306% on average, which is very low in 
magnitude. Logically, this is also consistent because 
a larger population means that enrollment will rise 
due purely to the number of people in the state. 
Finally, I found that on average as an additional 
year passes, enrollment in SNAP increases by 
5.977% holding other explanatory variables in the 
model constant.  
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V. Conclusion 
 I tested the hypothesis that increasing the 
minimum wage results in a decrease in enrollment 
of SNAP. Using panel data from 50 states from 
1998 to 2014, I found that an increase in minimum 
wage in prior years results in an average decrease of 
SNAP participation by 3.948%. The model used to 
find this result was a time-demeaned equation with 
an ordinary least squares regression. Other 
explanatory variables in the model were the 
unemployment rate, population growth, the percent 
of blacks in the state, and time.  
 This research only begins to uncover 
causality between minimum wage policy and public 
assistance programs. Further research could either 
continue uncovering how the minimum wage 
impacts the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance 
26 
 
Program by evaluating expenditure or by attempting 
to find additional data with a larger year span to 
examine enrollment. Also, there are various public 
assistance programs that could be tested to attempt 
to establish causality between spending or 
participation and the minimum wage. Additionally, 
I did not evaluate increase in the minimum wage 
using specific monetary values since I used a 
dummy variable to capture if a state experienced a 
different minimum wage. Returning to this project, 
one could examine marginal impacts of a higher 
minimum wage. 
 Investigating the impact of the minimum 
wage on SNAP enrollment is important because 
establishing causality could impact our nation’s 
attitude and policy. Furthermore, we could uncover 
27 
 
ways to reduce federal spending while continuing to 
provide a safety net for the most vulnerable. 
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Restructuring the Eurozone 
 
By: Anthony Juliano 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper suggests that there should be a 
realignment of the current Eurozone. There has 
been research to argue that the Eurozone does not 
fit the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria. This 
might be a contributing factor to the current 
economic crisis in Europe. I propose, based on 
results from k-means data clustering, that the 
Eurozone be divided into three separate regions 
under the European Central Bank (ECB). The 
division would allow for enhanced stabilization and 
efficiency due to better fitting of the OCA criteria 
and policy implications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**I would like to acknowledge Professor Charles Wessel for his 
assistance with the data-clustering segments of this paper and 
Professor Charles Weise for his overall advisement throughout the 
construction of this paper. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In 1992, the Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU) or Maastricht Treaty created the European 
Union. The treaty outlined five objectives for the 
Union in the ensuing years.   The objective relevant 
to this paper is the establishment of the economic 
and monetary union.  This paper proposes a division 
of the current Eurozone into three regional currency 
areas based on k-means data clustering results for 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth.  
On a large scale, the Economics and 
Monetary Union (EMU) created interdependence 
within the member countries, in hopes to prevent 
conflicts like the first two World Wars in the future. 
Both Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) 
indicate benefits to establishing monetary unions or 
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Optimum Currency Areas (OCA). Mundell (1961) 
argues that the adoption of a single currency 
eliminates the problem of domestic currency 
conversion, as the cost of valuation of foreign 
currencies, “tend to increase with the number of 
currencies” (Mundell, 662). In addition, money as a 
unit of account is less functional, “if the prices of 
foreign goods are expressed in terms of foreign 
currency and must then be translated into domestic 
currency prices” (Mundell, 662). Thus, the 
conversion of domestic currencies should make 
exchange between member countries less expensive 
and more efficient. Building on this idea, 
McKinnon (1963) discusses the benefits associated 
with an economy's openness as measured by the 
size of the tradable sector, the industry sectors 
whose output in terms of goods or services are 
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traded internationally, relative to that of the non-
tradable sector. In a small and highly open 
economy, the general price level in domestic 
currency is sensitive to exchange rate movements. 
Therefore, monetary unification appears rational, as 
the economic benefit of a more stable price level 
would outweigh the economic cost of losing a 
monetary policy instrument (exchange rate 
manipulation). At the personal level, each European 
would also recognize a more efficient system for 
buying international goods, while the integration of 
markets, in theory, should create increase labor 
mobility.  
There are also costs to single currency areas. 
The largest and most significant is the misalignment 
of member countries’ business cycles. This makes 
the policymaking of the ECB more difficult because 
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one country may be experiencing a booming 
economy and another could be in recession. One 
can currently observe this in Europe today as many 
of the northern countries are suffering due to the 
recessions in southern European countries like 
Spain and Greece.  
Several papers have proposed either the 
creation of a fiscal union or banking union in the 
Eurozone as a means of fixing the current financial 
crisis. A fiscal union would allow the Eurozone as a 
whole to introduce unified fiscal policies in order to 
stabilize economic issues specific to certain 
countries. In a different approach, this paper will 
address the current state of the EMU and propose a 
solution considering OCA theory. I propose that the 
current 19 EMU member nations should be 
rearranged into regional currency areas under one 
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central bank, the ECB. The first section will discuss 
OCA theories and the second section will discuss 
how well the Eurozone fits the OCA criteria. The 
third section presents my argument for a 
restructuring of the Eurozone with both my method 
and results. Finally, in the last section, I will draw 
conclusions. 
II. REVIEW OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA 
THEORY 
 In order to evaluate the EMU as a currency 
area, it is important to understand Mundell’s 
original theory. “An optimum currency area can be 
defined as the optimal geographical area for a single 
currency, or for several currencies, whose exchange 
rates are irrevocably pegged. The single currency, 
or the pegged currencies, fluctuate jointly vis-à-vis 
other currencies” (Mongelli, 2). Mundell (1961) 
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initially suggested a world that was broken into 
regional currency areas. “If the world can be 
divided into regions within each of which there is 
factor mobility and between which there is factor 
immobility, then each of these regions should have 
separate currency which fluctuates relative to all 
other currencies” (Mundell, 663).  He claimed that 
the presence of such a system would then “carry the 
argument” for the reasoning behind flexible 
exchange rates. The mobility of factors of 
production within regions would allow for 
stabilization process in the event of a demand shift. 
For example, when the demand shifts from good A 
to good B, there will be temporary unemployment 
surrounding the production of good A. Factor 
mobility would then allow for the unemployed 
workers to move to good B’s industry, as the 
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increased demand would require increased supply. 
Thus, the first criterion for an optimum currency 
area is the mobility of factors of production, more 
specifically geographic labor mobility. The second 
criterion addresses the idea of the symmetry of 
shocks between countries. The currency area should 
include countries that tend to experience economic 
booms and recessions symmetrically, so that the 
appropriate monetary policies can be assigned for 
each occasion. The third criterion is the integration 
of product markets.  
 Mongelli (2008) provides an extensive 
analysis of OCA theory from its initial theories to 
the most current research at the time of the paper. 
He separates the criterion of the integration of 
product markets into the degree of economic 
openness and the diversification of production and 
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consumption. Economic openness incorporates the 
degree of trade integration, the share of tradable 
versus non-tradable goods and services, the 
marginal propensity to export, and international 
capital mobility. Production and consumption 
diversification is essential because it decreases the 
impact of sectoral shocks to the economy. “More 
diversified partner countries are more likely to 
endure small costs from forsaking nominal 
exchange rate changes amongst them, and to find a 
single currency more beneficial” (Mongelli, 3). He 
discusses the tradeoffs of a single currency area, as 
argued by Tower and Willett (1976). They claimed 
that the usefulness of money is increased for more 
open countries, but they compromise the liberty of 
discretionary macroeconomic policies. Therefore, 
countries would not have instruments to gain 
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internal balance during a shock. Mongelli (2008) 
compares the cost-benefit analysis of previous 
literature and concludes that price and wage 
inflation and similarity of shocks are the most 
important characteristics, with the similarity of 
shocks acting as a “catch all” property.  
 A unique aspect of Mongelli (2008) is the 
presentation of the “new” OCA theory. The first 
difference between the new and old theory is the 
cost of dependent macroeconomic policy. The 
monetarist movement argued that the cost was not 
as great as the pioneering economists had thought. 
However, more recent studies now claim that the 
costs are not as large as the pioneers thought nor as 
low as the monetarists suggested, but somewhere in 
between the extremes. Second, there is a 
creditability problem for countries that have 
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historically high inflation to claim low and stable 
future inflation. The solution is having an “anchor” 
country that has had a proven history of low 
inflation in the monetary union to legitimize the 
expectation.  The third alteration falls in line with 
the theory of labor mobility, as it discusses the 
importance of wage bargaining. Nations that are 
contemplating a single currency should join with 
nations that have similarly organized labor markets. 
“Countries with either strong centralization or 
strong decentralization are more capable of facing 
supply shocks than countries with an intermediate 
degree of centralization” (Mongelli, 13). Finally, 
the “new” theory discusses the implications of 
losing nominal exchange rate as an instrument. The 
classical opinion identified a lag in the manipulation 
of the exchange rate, which rendered the effects of 
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the change less effective. However, the more recent 
opinion, based upon various European devaluations 
of the 1980s, is that there is a significant cost in 
losing the ability to manipulate the nominal 
exchange rate. Thus, it is imperative to partner with 
nations that have similar symmetry of shocks so that 
there is a harmonization of policy. The final 
component involves empirical tests of the criteria, 
which are similar to the tests run by Eichengreen 
(1991) and O’Rourke and Taylor (2013) in the next 
section. 
Does Europe fit the criteria? 
 Eichengreen (1991) offers a critique of 
whether Europe is an optimum currency area. To do 
this, he used the variability in the real exchange 
rates and regional stock price differentials of the 
European countries to illustrate the symmetry of 
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shocks between the nations. The variation in real 
exchange rates represents the lack of symmetry 
between nations, as nations experiencing booms 
should have higher relative prices. Thus, if nations 
were experiencing a boom at the same time, the 
prices should both be high with little difference 
between them. Eichengreen tests this criterion by 
finding the standard deviations of the European real 
exchange rates for the 1970s and 1980s and 
compares them to that of the U.S. For the 1970s 
(see Figure 1), the European standard deviations 
ranged from 5.4 to 14.0 percent, averaging 8.9 
percent, whereas the U.S.’s ranged from 2.0 to 2.7 
percent. For the 1980s (see Figure 2), European 
standard deviations ranged from 1.0 to 9.6 percent, 
averaging 5.7 percent and the U.S.’s ranged from 
1.3 to 1.5 percent. The regional stock price 
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differentials should also show the symmetry of 
shocks because, “the profits of equities should 
reflect the present value of current and expected 
future profits” (Eichengreen, 6). Therefore, the 
more closely related the real share prices are across 
the regions, the more asymmetric the shocks. He 
evaluates the differentials between the average 
prices of securities traded on the two regional 
Canadian stock exchanges (Toronto and Montreal) 
with differentials between Paris and Dusseldorf.  
The results show that the stock prices in Canada are 
historically more correlated than those in Paris and 
Dusseldorf, therefore region-specific shocks are 
stronger than in Canada.  
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Figure 1. 1970s Range of Real Exchange Rate 
Standard Deviations from Eichengreen (1991) 
 
 
Figure 2. 1980s Range of Real Exchange Rate 
Standard Deviations from Eichengreen (1991) 
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 Next, Eichengreen (1991) investigates the 
labor mobility criterion. He bases this section on 
previous research that made a systematic 
comparison of the mobility within the U.S. and 
within the European nation. That study found that 
the mobility in the U.S. was two to three times as 
high as mobility within Europe. He also references 
his own past research in which he estimated 
regional unemployment differentials for both 
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Europe and the U.S. The study found that regional 
unemployment rates in the U.S. adjust to one 
another approximately 20 percent faster than 
national unemployment rates of European countries 
adjust. While the results clearly show that there is 
not significant labor mobility between European 
nations, Eichengreen (1991) does warn of bias due 
to the presence of international barriers.  
 In addition to this analysis, O’Rourke and 
Taylor (2013) also provides data to question the 
suitability of an OCA for the 17 Eurozone countries 
(note Latvia and Lithuania adopted the Euro after 
this paper was published). For the market 
integration criterion, they compare cross-border 
interstate trade as a percent of GDP for the U.S. and 
the Eurozone. They find that cross-border interstate 
trade was 66 percent of GDP in the U.S. and only 
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17 percent in the Eurozone. For symmetry of shocks 
criterion, they considered the correlation between 
local growth and growth in the monetary union as a 
whole. The average correlation between real GDP 
growth in the eight U.S. Census regions and the 
national real GDP growth was .78 and the average 
correlation between real GDP growth in the 
Eurozone countries and real GDP growth across the 
entire Eurozone was 0.5. Finally, to measure labor 
mobility, they consider the average amount of 
people who were born outside of the current U.S. 
state that they live in compared to the amount of 
people born outside of the Eurozone country where 
they currently live. The results were that 42 percent 
of people in the U.S. were born outside of their 
current state and only 14 percent of people in the 
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Eurozone were born outside of their current 
country.  
 
Figure 3. Results for each criterion from Taylor and 
O'Rourke (2013) 
 
 
 These results are only a small share of tests 
that can be used to evaluate the EMU’s ability to 
meet the OCA criteria. Therefore, a more important 
study would be to identify how the EMU should 
move forward in correcting the problem of not 
meeting the OCA, a problem that is somewhat 
responsible for the current economic crisis. Mundell 
(1961), Eichengreen (1991), and O’Rourke and 
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Taylor (2013), along with many more in recent 
years, suggest that there should be a fiscal union, 
banking union, or both to support the monetary 
union that is in place. However, I would like to 
propose an alternative method to deal with the 
current economic situation and promote future 
economic synchronization.  
III. RESTRUCTURING THE CURRENT EUROZONE 
As I mentioned above, Mundell (1961) 
initially saw the benefit in dividing the world into 
optimum currency area regions. I would like to test 
this theory in the current EMU today because of the 
following reasons. First, it is apparent from the 
existing literature that the current 19 independent 
member nations do not appropriately fit the OCA 
criteria. Second, a single currency in the Eurozone 
has proven to be detrimental for both the countries 
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themselves and the value of the currency, as the 
Eurodollar has depreciated by approximately 15.9 
percent over the last year and drastically over the 
past five years (see Graph 1). Though one may 
argue that the depreciated currency has aided the 
Eurozone economies from worse conditions, I see it 
as a sign of a weaker economy than it traditionally 
has been. Third, I believe that the continued 
existence of a monetary union in Europe is 
beneficial for maintaining stability on a continent 
with an abundance of developed economies. In 
consideration of all three reasons, I argue that there 
should be a restructuring of the 19 Eurozone nations 
into regional currency areas that would continue to 
operate under one central bank, the ECB. 
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Graph 1. Historical Euro Dollar exchange rate from 
2005-2015. 
 
Source: www.tradingeconomics.com |OTC 
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Regional Currency Areas 
 Monegelli (2008) provides a blanket 
statement for the benefits of single currency areas. 
He argues, “The benefits from a single currency 
area result principally from the increased usefulness 
of money, the disappearance of intra-area nominal 
exchange rate uncertainty that would foster trade 
and promote cross-area foreign direct investments, 
and the access to broader and more transparent 
financial markets” (Mongelli, 5). With that, it may 
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seem unproductive to separate an already 
established single currency area. However, Mundell 
(1961) presents a section specifically pertaining to 
the theory of regional currencies. He argues an idea 
that excess demand in one region, experiencing 
inflationary pressure, could be transferred to the 
region lacking demand, experiencing 
unemployment, by allowing regional exchange rates 
to fluctuate. Therefore, if the EMU continued its 
policies to maintain price stability and full 
employment, there might be a stabilization 
mechanism in optimum currency regions with 
independent currencies. If one region was 
experiencing a boom and another a recession, the 
ECB would allow the booming currency to inflate, 
while the busting currency would depreciate. This 
manipulation would have an effect on exchange 
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rates, so that the demand for goods in the booming 
region would fall and the goods in the busting 
region would become more desirable. Therefore, 
one of the most significant costs of single currency 
areas, the narrowing of macroeconomic policy 
instruments, will become less significant with the 
establishment of three regional currencies. Under 
this system, the ECB would control the currency 
and monetary policy for each of the regions, as they 
will remain in the EMU.  
There are some risks associated with this 
suggestion. Mundell (1961) claims that during, “the 
gold standard depression in one country would be 
transmitted, through the foreign-trade multiplier, to 
foreign countries. Similarly, under common 
currency, depression in one region would be 
transmitted to other regions for precisely the same 
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reasons” (Mundell, 660). This would suggest that 
the interdependence of the regions on each other 
could be detrimental if all of the regions fell into 
depression at the same time. There is also the risk 
that “fine-tuning” will prove to be ineffective in 
practice. There are many factors that contribute to 
the well being of an economy, so the theoretical 
belief that the regional currencies will promote 
stabilization mechanisms could fall apart. Overall, 
the division of the current Eurozone nations into 
sub-regions under the ECB presents benefits with 
more proper alignment and potential stabilization 
instruments, but has certain risk of only being 
functional in theory. 
Method 
To further this idea, I use both theoretical 
and statistical analysis. First, I have considered the 
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regional currency area theory in Mundell (1961) 
and Mongelli (2008) by outlining their frameworks 
in the last section to debate the cost and benefits of 
having the currency areas, specifically how they 
respond to shocks in demand. In order to determine 
the number of regions and the placement of 
countries for each region, I use the k-means data 
clustering method. k-means is a widely accepted 
form of data clustering that finds K clusters by 
minimizing the distance between each data point 
and its cluster’s center (centroid) using an iterative 
algorithm that adjusts each centroid’s location. With 
this method, the similar countries clustered around 
the same centroid will be grouped in the same 
currency region. My goal is to find three distinct 
groupings of the Eurozone countries’ based on GDP 
growth rates to illustrate the symmetry of nations’ 
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shocks. The GDP growth metric is used in 
agreement with Mongelli (2008). I will run the k-
means in the MATLAB software over 1,000 times 
in order to find the clusters with the lowest mean 
distance from the counties to the respective 
centroids.  My dataset includes pre-financial crisis 
annual GDP data from 2000-2007, extracted from 
World Data Bank. I would prefer to use quarterly 
GDP data to better observe how the business cycles 
fluctuated throughout the year for each nation, but 
am limited to annual data for this paper. In addition 
to the output from the k-means tests, I will also use 
geographic location as a determinant. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
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Figure 4. k-means cluster for the Baltic Region 
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European Currency Regions  
My statistical analysis provided me with 
three regions for the current Eurozone. The k-means 
test was run 1,200 times and the sum of the mean 
distances from country to centroid for each cluster 
was 243.25. The output provided numerous 
combinations of mean distances for each cluster. 
However, the sum of the three clusters was a 
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recurring number throughout the tests. Therefore, I 
used the lowest of the sums, which a combination of 
the three was 243.25 the majority of the time. The 
three regions that the k-means results determine are 
shown Figures 4-6 with the Baltic, Eastern, and 
Western Currency Regions. The only change that I 
have made based on location is the addition of 
Finland to the Baltic Currency Region. Therefore, 
the Baltic Region includes Estonia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Slovakia, and Finland. The Eastern Region 
includes Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Luxembourg, 
Cyprus, and Ireland. The Western Region includes 
France, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Malta, Belgium, 
The Netherlands, and Austria. While the Baltic 
Region is logical based on location, the Eastern and 
Western Region results were more difficult to 
justify. The Western region consists mostly of the 
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larger and more disciplined economies, with 
Germany at the forefront. However, the k-means 
results further suggest that the economies that 
continue to experience economic crises are 
correlated. I believe it may be beneficial for policy 
making purposes to have a stronger and more stable 
region in the Western Region and a recovering 
region in the Eastern region. I will further discuss 
policy implications of the new currency regions in 
the next section. 
Cyprus
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Slovenia
Spain
Eastern Currency Region 
Figure 5. k-means cluster for the Eastern Region 
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Policy Implications 
My recommendation for policy in such a 
system would be to maintain similar, if not the same 
targets the ECB has today. The new EMU as a 
whole would target 2% inflation, but each region 
could have fluctuating rates in order to enable the 
stabilization mentioned above. The important 
question is why I have decided to place one central 
Austria
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Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Malta
Portugal
Western Currency Region 
Figure 6. k-means clustering for the Western Region 
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bank in charge of three different currencies. My 
reasoning is twofold. First, there are distinct reasons 
why the EMU unified monetary policy in the first 
place. Second, there is substantial literature that has 
established the benefits to integrating international 
policy. Tavlas (2004) addresses the significant 
creditability that countries that have had recent 
histories of relatively high inflation rates (Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain) gained from eliminating 
the “inflation-bias problem of discretionary 
monetary policy” (Tavlas, 94). Those countries 
were infamous for overstimulating the economies 
and financing debt and deficits through inflationary 
measures. Confining the erratic economies to the 
policies of prudent economies like Germany, with 
low and stable inflation and inflation expectations, 
makes each much more creditable and stable. In 
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consideration of this idea, it would seem foolish to 
remove policymaking from the one unified central 
bank due to the risk of potential erratic behavior of 
countries with previously flawed economic 
behavior.  
In addition, Pikoulakis (1995) devotes a 
chapter to international monetary policy 
coordination. He claims that in a multiple country 
world with rigidities in wages and prices there are 
negative externalities associated with independent 
monetary policymaking. By using an example of 
monetary expansion, Pikoulakis presents how the 
depreciation of a home currency results in definite 
“beggar thy neighbor” effects. He concludes by 
saying the, “absence of international policy 
coordination leads to contradictory monetary 
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policies relative to the cooperative outcome” 
(Pikoulakis, 185). 
In consideration of both of these points, it is 
logical to delegate the control of each currency to 
one central bank to ensure appropriate and 
consistent policymaking behavior along with proper 
coordination of each regions respective policies.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 One of the main objectives of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992 was to promote the interdependence 
of European nations by forming a stable and 
effective economic and monetary union. The 
current economic situation in Europe is quite the 
opposite as the troubles of Greece and other 
southern European nations have caused a significant 
crisis. The crisis calls for new improvements in 
order to revive many strong, developed economies. 
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This paper reiterates the points of Eichengreen 
(1991) and O’Rourke and Taylor (2013) by 
agreeing that the current Eurozone is not an 
optimum currency area by theory. I suggest that the 
Eurozone could be more stable and efficient if it 
were divided into three sub-regions. The Baltic 
Region, the Eastern Region, and the Western 
Region, would have independent currencies 
controlled by one central bank in the ECB. The 
ECB would continue to target inflation as it does 
today union-wide, while using regional monetary 
policy as instruments. While this proposal is merely 
theoretical, further research could make the idea of 
European currency regions more practical.  
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Negative Interest Rates: Analyses Abroad and their 
Applicability to the U.S. Economy 
By Danielle Cupp 
Abstract 
The twenty-first century has thus far posed 
some of the most difficult economic challenges for 
policy makers that the world has ever seen. The 
most recent recession, the Global Financial Crisis of 
2007-8, is considered the worst economic downturn 
in recent history. In light of unique challenges such 
as the recession, central banks around the world are 
coming up with new tools or new ways of thinking 
about tools in order to mediate financial crises. This 
paper investigates the possibility of eliminating the 
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates to 
stimulate the economy in reaction to severe 
financial crises. To substantiate my claim for 
negative interest rates in times of crises, I challenge 
the conventional theory regarding the fear of 
negative interest rates, examine the success of other 
countries that have employed negative interest rates 
in order to stimulate economic growth, and provide 
one example of how potential negative outcomes 
can be avoided. This paper makes the case that 
while more research on negative interest rates is to 
be done, they are a valid option for an economy in 
crisis and could be used in another circumstance 
similar to the recession that the U.S. economy faced 
in 2008-9.  
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I. Introduction: Interest Rates, Conceptually 
 The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8 is 
said, by scholars, to have been the worst financial 
downturn the world had seen since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. It threatened the collapse 
of major financial institutions that were only 
prevented through bailouts, which did not prevent a 
massive drop in stock prices worldwide. Risk-
averse banks withheld from lending to businesses 
and households. Much of the recession can be 
characterized as a liquidity crisis, in reaction to 
which government and central banks resorted to 
unprecedented fiscal stimulus, monetary policy, and 
institutional bailouts. 
When a central bank cuts interest rates, they 
are effectively using the tools that they have to 
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boost an economy that is not faring well. 
Decreasing interest rates make investment and 
consumption more attractive. Additionally, net 
exports increase and the price of stocks increases. 
Raising the interest rate also increases employment 
and increases the demand for financial assets. In 
times of economic crisis, the Federal Reserve has 
historically cut interest rates in order to stimulate 
the economy in all of the ways that were just listed. 
After the financial crisis in 2007-8, not only did the 
Federal Reserve cut interest rates, but many other 
central banks around the world reduced their 
nominal interest rate to 1% or less as well (Ball, 
20). The Federal Reserve, though, has neglected to 
lower interest rates below zero, having constructed 
a floor on short term nominal interest rate at zero, 
also referred to as the zero lower bound. In reality, 
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however, decreasing interest rates have the 
economic benefits listed above and lowering 
interest rates further (to below zero) only increases 
the stimulus to the economy. Conceptually, the 
difference between a 1% interest rate and a 0% 
interest rate is the same as that between 0% and -
1%. If negative interest rates only further stimulate 
the economy, why did the Fed not employ them 
upon one of the worst financial traumas of the past 
century? 
 
II. Analysis from the Taylor Rule 
 An analysis on the Taylor Rule provides a 
more concrete perspective on whether or not 
negative interest rates should have been 
implemented after the Global Financial Crisis of 
2007-8. The Taylor Rule is a monetary policy 
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formulae created by John Taylor in 1993 to 
determine how much the Fed (or other central 
banks) should change the nominal interest rate in 
response to changes in inflation and output. The 
relationship between inflation and the nominal 
interest rate implies that as inflation rises by one 
percentage point, the nominal interest rate also 
rises. My analysis (Graph 1), however, reveals that 
the Taylor Rule shows that interest rates should 
have been negative after the start of the Global 
Financial crisis to one degree or another and that by 
keeping interest rates above zero after the recession 
of 2007-8, the Fed deviated from the Taylor Rule.  
 In order to conduct this analysis, I compared 
the effective Federal Funds Rate to two different 
interpretations of the Taylor Rule. In this case, the 
Taylor Formula was constructed by subtracting 
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unemployment and personal consumption 
expenditures from the sum of the natural 
unemployment rate and the target inflation rate. The 
graph illustrates that if the Fed had followed the 
Taylor Rule and the target inflation rate was 2%, the 
interest rate would have been made negative in July 
2009. Minimums as low as -.3, -.34, and -.24 would 
have been reached in November 2010, October 
2009, and April 2010, respectively. The interest rate 
would have fluctuated back and forth from negative 
to positive until October of 2010 when they would 
have remained positive until present.  
Some argue, however, that the target 
inflation rate is lower: 1%. If this is the case, then 
the projected interest rates as computed by the 
Taylor Rule would be even lower. According to this 
formula, negative interest rates should have been 
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implemented as early as March of 2009 and 
minimums as low as -1.3, -1.34, and -1.24 would 
have been reached in November 2010, October 
2009, and April 2010, respectively. In addition, a 
negative Federal Funds rate would have been in 
effect until October of 2011 while the economy 
recovered. In actuality, however, between March of 
2009 and October of 2011, the effective Federal 
Funds Rate was an average of .15%. During this 
time, the rate reached a minimum of .07% and 
reached a maximum of .21%, but the effective rate 
was never negative.  
Either take on the Taylor Rule shows how 
there was a need for negative interest rates after the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8 that were not 
employed.  
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Graph 1: 
 
 
Data from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
III. False Sense of Flight to Cash 
 The fears that the Fed has relating to 
negative interest rates are misplaced conceptually. 
Negative interest rates stimulate the economy 
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because banks are charging their depositors to hold 
cash reserves while reducing borrowing costs for 
businesses and households, driving the demand for 
loans up. Scholars however are concerned that by 
charging depositors to hold money in their accounts, 
there would be a ‘flight to cash’. In other words, 
due to the cost of holding money in accounts, 
people would prefer to hold their assets as cash 
instead. I will explore, however, why a decrease in 
interest rates below zero will not result in a ‘flight 
to cash’.  
 First, there are a lot of conveniences 
associated with having money deposited into 
accounts rather than holding it in cash that would 
incentivize depositors to keep their money in their 
accounts even if they were charged for doing so. 
Many aspects of society as they relate to finance 
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revolve around checking accounts. On an individual 
level, people pay their bills online and pay for their 
groceries or for a night out with their credit or debit 
card. For larger purchases, it is even more 
convenient to pay with a credit card as opposed to 
cash. To a certain extent, I would argue, people 
would be willing to keep their own money in an 
account because it would not be worth the 
inconvenience to have money solely in the form of 
cash. American society has created many processes 
in daily life that involve the use of bank accounts. If 
depositors were charged some fee to keep their 
money in bank accounts, individuals would be 
willing to put up with a fee in order to avoid the 
inconveniences of not having these accounts.  
 On a larger level, such as a big business, it is 
also unlikely that corporations would want to also 
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withdraw their money from their accounts because 
so many of their processes involve transactions 
through the banking system. They, for example, pay 
their customers through basic transactions. 
Companies buy out other companies through 
transactions as well. The idea of a business 
partaking in either purchasing other companies or 
paying their employees through cash is almost 
unimaginable. Again, through the example of 
businesses, we see how inconvenient it would be for 
our society to transition from processes involving 
bank accounts to those of cash. To some extent, 
businesses would be willing to endure negative 
interest rates because it is so convenient to make 
transactions through bank accounts rather than 
through cash.  
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 Additionally, a ‘flight to cash’ would not be 
reasonable considering that holding assets in cash 
would require some expense in order to keep them 
safe. Individuals who did not have a lot of money in 
their accounts (college students for example) might 
not feel compelled to buy a safe to store their few 
hundred dollars. Older individuals with life savings 
of greater magnitude would, rationally, want to buy 
a safe of some kind to secure their wealth. With 
more wealth comes a greater incentive (but also a 
greater cost as safes would need to be larger and 
therefore more expensive) to secure their wealth. 
On the level of businesses, again, the prospect that a 
large corporation would pull out their money into 
cash and finance some kind of vault and security 
system just to avoid a charge on keeping their 
money in an account is almost unimaginable. If 
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there were negative interest rates, individuals and 
businesses would be willing to endure a charge to 
keep their funds in a bank account as long as that 
charge was less than what it would cost to keep that 
money safe outside of a bank account.  
 There must be an interest rate at which 
either individuals or corporations do decide that it 
would not be worth it to keep money in accounts 
and does, in fact, partake in a ‘flight to cash’, but I 
suggest, for the reasons relating to convenience and 
security of assets above, that the zero lower bound 
does not exist. There is a lower bound on interest 
rates, but it is less than zero. The degree to which 
the lower bound is less than zero is unknown and 
requires further analysis. 
IV. Negative Interest Rates in Europe 
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 Negative interest rates have been 
implemented in countries outside of the United 
States and did not lead to the flight to cash that 
economists working at the Fed fear. Negative 
interest rates were implemented in certain European 
countries after the most recent financial crisis. An 
examination of these countries provides further 
evidence that the lower bound does not exist at zero 
and that negative interest rates are a viable 
monetary policy tool should the world see another 
severe recession. 
Sweden was the first nation in this 
discussion to experiment with negative interest 
rates. From July 2009 to September 2010, nominal 
interest rates were cut to -.25% as a result of the 
deep recession and having an inflation rate that was 
persistently below the target rate. Beginning in 
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2014, the deposit rate was lowered to -.5% and in 
February of 2015, the repo rate also became 
negative, drawing the deposit rate down to -1.1%. It 
has also announced that it anticipates that the 
interest rate will remain negative until the end of 
2016 at the earliest. Even though depositors at the 
Riksbank have charged a fee of -1.1% and some 
government and mortgage bonds, interest rate 
derivatives, and certificates, have traded at negative 
rates, the bank has reported that market functioning 
has been pretty average thus far, with some 
concerns only in the bond market (Jackson, 11). 
Of any central bank in Europe, Denmark has 
experienced the longest duration of interest rates as 
well as the lowest interest rate of any country or 
region under analysis in this paper. In Denmark, 
interest rates were lowered to -.2% in July of 2012, 
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were raised to -.1% in January of 2013, and only 
became positive again in April of 2014. This was 
done to discourage upward capital flows that were 
placing upward pressure on the krone. The central 
bank in Denmark, additionally, is one of the few 
banks to lower interest rates back to a negative rate. 
The central bank of Denmark lowered interest rates 
to -.75% in September 2014 again to manage 
upward pressure on the krone and still has a 
negative interest rate today. In its most recent 
assessment, the Danmarks Nationalbank found that 
negative interest rates did not weaken the pass-
through of money to money markets and there have 
been no significant increases in the demand for cash 
(Jackson, 8).  
The European Central Bank lowered interest 
rates to -.1% in June 2014 and again to -.2% in 
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September 2014 due to weak economic growth and 
inflation. The euro area reported “no significant 
outflows or dislocations in money market funds” 
(Jackson, 9). Harriet Jackson, an economist at the 
Bank of Canada, notes that there was some concern 
in the Eurozone that there would be declines in 
borrowing from the central bank, but this has not 
happened (Jackson, 9-10).  
As evident by the multiple countries in this 
study who have implemented negative interest rates 
in the past decade, there have been no major 
backlashes to these changes in monetary policy. 
There has been no indication of a flight to cash by 
depositors thus far. Jackson, a scholar who 
advocates for the use of negative interest rates who 
also draws evidence from these countries in his own 
analysis, however, warns that the expectations of 
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negative interest rates may discourage large 
deposits in the banks (Jackson, 14). Given that 
negative interest rates are still relatively new, there 
has not been evidence to indicate that this has 
happened in economies that have used interest rates, 
but, again, the longest a central bank has employed 
negative interest rates without any breaks of 
positive interest rates was one year and nine months 
in Denmark. Jackson concludes that while negative 
interest rates have not been in effect for very long 
and in many countries, evidence still suggests that 
they are a viable tool in monetary policy.  
 
V. Gesell Stamp 
For those who are convinced that a flight to 
cash would be within reason should the Federal 
Reserve decide to experiment with negative interest 
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rates, there have been economic scholars who have 
devised creative solutions to eliminate the zero 
lower bound in a way that the flight to cash is not a 
risk. The first to do this was Silvio Gesell, a 
German-Argentine alive during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. He was the first to 
pioneer the idea of avoiding zero bound traps by 
paying a negative nominal interest rate on money 
(Buiter, 725). The possibility of taxing currency has 
not been realized in history mostly because of the 
practical difficulties associated with such a feat, but 
Gesell proposed that in order to provide evidence 
that negative interest rates, or the tax, had been 
paid, all cash could be stamped. Decades later, 
Keynes wrote his own thoughts regarding the 
complications that a tax on currency would entail. 
He argued that Gesell was “unaware that money 
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was not unique in having a liquidity-premium 
attached to it, but differed only in degree from many 
other articles, deriving its importance from having a 
greater liquidity-premium than any other article” 
(Keynes, 230). In other words, Keynes thought if 
currency was taxed, people would resort to 
bartering goods, but he did say that he regarded 
Gesell’s theory as sound. While there are still costs 
associated with administering a tax on money, even 
if a low-cost, tamper-proof high-tech version can be 
established. For this reason, Buiter brings up the 
importance of determining the benefits associated 
with eliminated the zero lower bound and the 
related costs of taxing currency in order to 
determine if a stamp-like system is optimal (Buiter, 
730). In this way, Buiter is calling for more research 
to be done so that a central bank can understand the 
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costs associated with eliminating the lower bound 
and threats regarding the flight to cash.  
 
VI. Conclusions and Further Research 
 We have seen how the Federal Reserve has 
historically respected the zero lower bound and 
refrained from lowering interest rates into the 
negative territory despite the worst financial crisis 
since the Great Depression. Even though cuts in 
interest rates stimulate the economy and a further 
cut to a negative interest rate would have only 
stimulated the economy more, still the Federal 
Reserve abstained from setting a new precedent of 
lower interest rates in 2009. Even analysis regarding 
the Taylor Rule, however, suggests that negative 
interest rates were appropriate for such a poor 
economic climate. Negative interest rates have been 
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avoided in the past because there is fear of a flight 
to cash, or a situation in which depositors would 
withdraw their funds from their accounts as keeping 
their funds in their mattresses would be more 
profitable than being charged to keep them in 
accounts. Contrary to this position, much of 
modern-day society is built around the convenience 
of modern day banking systems, meaning that 
keeping all money as cash would be inconvenient, 
which suggests that people would be willing to pay 
(to some extent) to keep their money in their 
accounts. The lack of which the world has seen a 
flight to cash is evidenced by the fact that multiple 
European economies have implemented negative 
interest rates and have not experienced severe 
occurrences where masses of individuals have 
withdrawn all of their money from their accounts.  
88 
 
 While there have been no major increases in 
bank withdrawals to suggest that negative interest 
rates would not be a viable tool for monetary policy, 
their implementation is still in its infancy with only 
a handful of countries having experimented with 
them. The Fed should definitely consider negative 
interest rates as a future tool for economic crises 
and should pursue economic research relating to 
negative interest rates first to explore the 
unanswered questions relating to negative interest 
rates before there is an urgent need to use them. 
There is evidence, for example, that the lower 
bound does not exist at zero, which then raises the 
question of where it does exist. In other words, at 
what point would it not be worth it for people to 
keep their money in their bank accounts and decide 
to keep all of their money in cash? How low can 
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nominal interest rates go? One thing that influences 
this turning point is people’s expectations. If 
individuals are indifferent about whether or not they 
should pull all of their money from their bank 
accounts, but expect that interest rates will rise 
above zero in the near future, then they will be more 
inclined to keep their money in their accounts where 
the opposite is true if they expect that interest rates 
will stay below zero for a prolonged amount of 
time. Negative interest rates are a viable option for 
economies of the twenty-first century even though 
analysis is still needed to understand the full extent 
of their implications on an economy.  
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Global Climate Change, Fair Trade, and Coffee 
Price Volatility1 
By Thomas Segerstrom 
Abstract:  
Fair Trade coffee sales have grown exponentially 
over the past fifteen years amidst a volatile and 
shaky coffee commodity market.  This paper 
incorporates the prior research that global climate 
change will lead to more climate shocks with 
research on the coffee market’s volatility and 
farmer welfare.  In accordance with prior research 
on commodity volatility, I develop an OLS 
estimator of the volatility of prices received by 
growers and evaluate the effect of climate shocks on 
it.  I find that, when control variables are 
introduced, the volatility of the coffee price does 
increase at a statistically significant level with a 
climate shock.  I evaluate the claim made by the 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgements: I wish to thank Maureen Forrestal, and 
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Holz, and Peter & Rhoda Segerstrom for their help. 
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Fair Trade movement that their program is a way to 
mitigate climate change, and I incorporate 
qualitative research that confirms the concerns 
observed in relation to climate change and farmer 
welfare. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 There is overwhelming consensus among 
climate scientists that the earth’s temperature is 
increasing and becoming more unpredictable (IPCC 
2014).  Some climate scientists have suggested that 
agriculture over the past thirty years has been 
subject to more yield variability, and thus indirect 
changes in prices.  This increased variance in 
temperature can also lead to higher volatility in 
commodity markets (Brown and Gibson 2006).  
Coffee growers are one group of commodity 
producers who are particularly affected by price 
volatility, and it appears to be negatively affecting 
their wellbeing (Mohan et al. 2014).  In this paper, I 
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investigate the relationship between global climate 
change, particularly changes in temperature and 
climate shocks, and commodity price volatility in 
the coffee market.  In addition, I will examine, 
theoretically, whether Fair Trade contracts, which 
offer pre-negotiated prices to growers in exchange 
for more sustainable agricultural practices, can 
mitigate some of the negative effects of commodity 
price volatility for coffee producers. 
 Why is this important, economically?  In 
theory, many individuals will have to adapt to 
changing climate conditions, and many more will be 
unable to adapt.  This research is aimed at 
understanding climate-related price fluctuations and 
shocks in the coffee market, and examining to what 
extent voluntary Fair Trade initiatives could 
improve the welfare of farmers and help them adapt 
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to greater uncertainty.  Nevertheless, it is vital to the 
research since reducing the vulnerability to 
volatility is one of the primary goals of Fair Trade. 
 Existing statistical studies suggest that 
climate change has had a negative effect on crop 
yields and production (Lobell et al. 2010).  
Discussion on the concept of Fair Trade and climate 
change has focused on remarkably very few studies 
that have suggested a link between climate shocks 
and more volatility (Roache 2010, Brunner 2002).  
Prior literature has also incorporated climate 
simulation models to suggest that global climate 
change will create more price volatility and lead to 
considerable welfare losses for millions of people 
(Tran et al. 2012).  Rather than rely on climate 
models or specific individual cases, this project uses 
data on coffee markets, and temperature variations 
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to empirically measure the effects of climate change 
on prices and thus farmer welfare (via price 
volatility). 
 To begin, I model price volatility as the 
primary connection between climate change and 
farmer welfare; that is, climate change affects 
farmers because it leads to increased price volatility.  
There is prior evidence that, in general, persistent 
price volatility hurts farmers (Mohan et al. 2014).  I 
incorporate the shock of significant climate events 
into a regression of price volatility. 
 Results in this paper indicate that climate 
changes do have a significant impact on the 
volatility of coffee prices.  In addition to my 
quantitative analysis, I also incorporate a deeper 
perspective on climate change by presenting the 
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results of the interviews I had with small-agriculture 
producers.  This paper also presents areas for 
further research into volatility clustering in coffee 
prices. 
II. Literature Review 
 Commodity markets are, by nature, very 
volatile and prices change often.  This effect is 
easily noticeable since the liberalization of many 
commodity markets (rice, sugar, oil, coffee, etc.) 
near the end of the twentieth century (Cashin and 
McDermott, 2002) and even since then.  The 
economic history of many of coffee-producing 
economies indicates why this is the case.  Many 
coffee-producing countries were formerly Western-
controlled colonies and are still emerging as 
developing economies.  Thus, much of the coffee 
97 
 
production since the end of colonial times in many 
countries has been subject to various export-import 
schemes, market regulations, and region-wide 
protectionist policies.  However, since the end of 
the International Coffee Agreement in 1989, the 
coffee market has largely been subject to the forces 
of globalization and the free market, angering some. 
One “consequence” of the free market on 
commodity farmers has been that prices swing often 
at the whim of market forces and buyers.  The 
phenomenon of commodity price volatility has been 
investigated in previous papers that suggest that 
volatility is a problematic element for farmer 
welfare.  Cashin et al. (2001) examine the length 
and magnitude of price booms and slumps, coffee 
included, and determined that coffee prices endure 
more price swings, volatility, and longer periods of 
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lower prices than other commodities.  Additionally, 
Cashin and McDermott (2002) conclude that short-
run movements in commodity prices are highly 
unpredictable, and price volatility has been 
increasing in magnitude since the 1970s.  Moledina 
et al. (2004) analyze multiple commodities and seek 
to answer whether there are any welfare gains from 
less volatility. They argue that eliminating price 
volatility very little welfare gain. 
 No study has focused on climate change on 
the coffee market.  Older studies have found links 
between climate shocks like the El-Niño Southern 
Oscillation Index (Brunner 2002, Frechette and 
Delavan 1998).  More recent studies indicate 
projected changes in the coffee “suitability”, or 
ability of Arabica coffee to grow in pre-existing 
coffee regions (Ovalle-Rivera 2015).  With 
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potential changes in supply due to climate change, 
coffee prices and volatility will change too.  Tran et 
al. (2012) use complex climate simulations of 
multiple commodities to predict that changes in 
global temperatures in the coming years will lead to 
more price volatility leading to a welfare loss for 
millions of people.  This news can seem rather 
alarming, so it is imperative that the relationship 
between climate changes and coffee prices be 
investigated empirically to see what negative 
welfare effects it has had on farmers. 
 Preliminary estimates by Bacon (2005) and 
Dragasanu and Nunn (2014) show that Fair Trade 
farmers do in fact receive slightly higher prices than 
non-Fair Trade farmers.  As Mohan (2010) argues, 
Fair Trade can only establish long-term benefit for 
farmers if revenues, in contrast to price increases, 
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can be stabilized.  Volatility is important, 
nevertheless, and much of the prior literature 
suggests that it is a variable of interest in 
econometric analysis of farmer welfare. 
 This research paper incorporates these 
previous observations about the climate and market.  
It relates these concepts via estimation of volatility 
using standard deviation as authors have previously 
conducted using various standard control variables 
also used in prior findings.  With these estimations, 
this paper contributes statistical findings on 
volatility of coffee market that were previously only 
measured on other commodities. 
III. Theory 
 Volatility indicates how much a price varies 
from previous prices.  Volatility also measures an 
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inherent risk, financially, that exists when farmers 
must make seasonal production and investment 
decisions.  The more variation from previous 
values, the more of a welfare decrease for farmers, 
so to speak.  Farmers do not welcome volatility, in 
theory, because of the wider range of expected 
returns on crops.  Thus, increased volatility and 
farmer welfare have a negative relationship with 
each other because famers have a more difficult 
time making production decisions as predicting 
future prices is more challenging. 
Consistent with Roache (2010), in this paper 
I examine the determinants of volatility by running 
a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  
Within this OLS regression, I measure climate 
volatility in several ways, the effects of frost and 
drought by introducing dummy variables.  
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Theoretically, a frost or drought will reduce market 
supply and increase the coffee price.  Since farmers 
cannot prepare very adequately for a frost or 
drought occurrence as crops are outdoors and the 
climate effects are out of their control, if frosts and 
droughts do occur more frequently with global 
climate change, this higher level of volatility will 
lead to a decrease in their welfare.  Volatility in this 
context is measured by the rolling standard 
deviation of the monthly log price difference: 
𝑑𝑑 =  ln(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) − ln (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖−1).  This method to measuring 
volatility is adopted by several commodity-related 
studies (Mohan et al. 2014, Roache 2010).  I also 
introduce several control variables in the regression 
that account for other world market changes that 
could explain increased volatility, just as Roache 
(2010) does.  Thus, the regression model looks like: 
103 
 
(1) 𝜎𝜎(𝑑𝑑) =  𝐵𝐵0 + 𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 +
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎(𝜋𝜋)𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎(3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎(𝜀𝜀)𝑖𝑖 
Within, real represents the real inflation rate for a 
particular country, dusgdp represents the first 
difference of USGDP, a commodity-literature 
measure for demand changes, the level and standard 
deviation of the US inflation rate, the standard 
deviation of the US risk-free rate, and the standard 
deviation of the US exchange rate.  This modeling 
takes into account changes in world demand, 
measured broadly via USGDP, and other factors 
that might influence the volatility of coffee prices to 
growers identified by Roache (2010). 
IV. Data 
The prices included in this paper are from 
the International Coffee Organization (ICO) and 
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represent nominal monthly prices to growers in a 
panel of Arabica coffee producing nations from the 
period 1980-2013.  Prices are quoted in US cents/lb, 
and to derive a real price series, the prices are 
deflated using a UN “unit value index” obtained 
from the International Monetary Fund to keep 
consistent with Mohan et al. (2010).  This is done to 
keep measurement of prices consistent over time in 
real terms.  Monthly prices are also obtained from 
the IMF for index commodity prices.   
Weather data is taken from publicly 
available data from the US National Oceanographic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and is 
shown on the website’s map.  Weather dummy 
variables (0 or 1) used to indicate frost, or drought 
in a given month are derived from 
coffeeresearch.org.  Weather data about the 
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standard deviation of maximum temperature is 
taken from a weather station in Belo Horizonte, 
Brazil, a popular coffee-producing region in Brazil 
and combined with the coffeeresearch.org 
information.  Brazil has a very large market share of 
global Arabica coffee production, and many 
changes in coffee news, and prices are centered 
around Brazilian coffee production and climate.  
While the data as a whole are from a panel for price 
changes, the very large effect of Brazilian climate 
shocks has a noticeable effect in the news and 
changes in prices traded in financial markets are 
directly observed as a result.  Unfortunately, panel 
data on frosts and droughts cannot be completely 
traced and relied upon in NOAA data available as 
many weather archive reports from developing 
countries are incomplete.  However, the data from 
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Brazil and the website do work well with the other 
data. 
V. Results 
 The results of estimating equation (1) yields 
some very interesting results about volatility.  Using 
the regression model testing weather variables, the 
standard deviation of the grower price of coffee to 
producers in a panel of countries, and other 
important covariates, the results indicate that frost 
and drought have an immediate impact on coffee 
prices and volatility.  Additionally, the results 
indicate that it is not directly higher temperatures, 
commonly thought of with climate change, that lead 
to higher volatility levels, but rather shocks to the 
climate via droughts and frosts.  These weather 
events, which are thought to increase in the future 
with climate change, are crucial to understanding 
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why coffee prices are volatile.  Regression results 
are described in Table 1, below. 
 Within the table, regression (1) tests the 
standard deviation of the maximum temperature of 
the Brazil location.  The coefficient on this term 
(0.00023) is not statistically significant at any level, 
while other covariates are – this supports the 
understanding that higher temperatures are not 
directly relevant to coffee price volatility.  Rather, 
regression (2) tests, in Latin American countries and 
South America, whether climate shock weather 
changes such as drought and frost, which can kill 
crops and eliminate much of a farmer’s income.  
This term is statistically significant and positive 
(0.03717), meaning that on average, the standard 
deviation of the monthly log difference of prices 
received by growers increases.  Practically, this 
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means that the expected returns of the coffee price 
differs more with a higher coefficient.  With more 
spread-out expected returns, coffee farmers’ welfare 
is decreased. 
The term is also lagged to account for 
changes that occur in the month before that will 
affect farmers and their expected returns.  A similar 
regression (3) introduces a frost lag with the 
covariates and is statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  This coefficient is also positive (0.23180), 
meaning that volatility increases with a frost 
(lagged for the same reason).  These results support 
the belief, generally given by the farmers that I have 
interviewed and environmental economic 
researchers, that frosts and droughts are incredibly 
serious and affect volatility even when introduced 
with other explanatory variables for volatility.  
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While the R-squared values of these regressions are 
rather low, the low value is to be expected of time 
series, fixed effects regressions. 
 
Table 1 - Measuring Volatility of Grower Prices 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
St. Dev. Of 
Grower Price 
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VI. Qualitative Effects 
Qualitative research is a key aspect of 
market coffee research, and Fair Trade.  Research 
into the coffee market on the societal effects and 
opinions of those directly affected is often pushed to 
the wayside, even though it can reveal much of 
what cannot be quantified.  To get a taste of what 
Variable: (1) (2) (3) 
Inflation 
Level 
-0.00864 
(0.00197)*** 
-0.00332 
(0.001539)** 
-0.003667 
(0.001196)*** 
Real Interest 
Rate 
0.0023 
(0.00097)* 
0.00386 
(0.000811)*** 
0.002036 
(0.000622)*** 
dUSGDP -0.00006 
(0.000028)** 
-0.0001 
(0.00002)*** 
-0.000026 
(0.0000178) 
Inflation 
Volatility 
-0.03586 
(0.008221)*** 
-0.04075 
(0.006413)*** 
-0.030799 
(0.00497)*** 
Exchange 
Rate Vol. 
-1.7736 
(0.4642)*** 
-0.00205 
(0.004301) 
-1.01318 
(0.30070)*** 
SDMaxTemp 
Lag 
0.00023 
(0.000197) 
- - 
Frost Lag - - 0.23180 
(0.007854)** 
Frost or 
Drought Lag 
- 0.03717 
(0.00739)*** 
- 
Constant 0.1715 
(0.103)*** 
0.1356 
(0.00833)*** 
0.14396 
(0.00647)*** 
Fixed 
Effects? 
Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.031 0.031 0.020 
N 4370 4854 9935 
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels 
respectively. 
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was out there, I decided to get ahold of some 
agricultural producers in Adams County, PA that I 
knew I could get ahold of. 
Through a publication on agriculture and 
Adams county farming and tips from a college at 
Gettysburg College, I was able to get in contact 
with a Honduran farmer named Emilo Garcia, living 
in central PA.  Garcia and the other Adams county 
participants interviewed mentioned that price 
volatility is an important production concern.  
Additionally, frost and drought were concerning 
and a contemporary issue to all subjects 
interviewed.  These results confirm that climate 
change is indeed a serious issue addressing coffee 
farmers.  Furthermore, with research indicating that 
“suitability” of coffee farms becoming more 
difficult (Ovalle-Rivera 2015), as coffee must be 
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cultivated in a very specific climate that is, as of 
now, rapidly changing, more volatility may be 
expected. 
VII. Analysis of Regression Data and Further 
Research 
While the quantitative results are significant, 
they could be subject to some unforeseen 
complications.  It is possible that in evaluating 
volatility, the regressions omit key variables that 
have not been accounted for that might implicate 
the regression to misestimate the effects of frost 
and/or drought. This would lead to a misestimating 
of the coefficients. Measurement error, whether it 
be through how frost data and weather data are 
collected or how grower prices are gathered, is also 
a very likely problem that could occur in the 
regression results.  It is possible that Brazil is not 
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necessarily the only determinant for large-scale 
price fluctuations and volatility for coffee farmers 
due to frost and drought.  While these climate-
related events may happen elsewhere, Brazil still 
has such a large market share that it can capture 
many of these effects. 
One area for future research would be to 
introduce a study of volatility clustering. Volatility 
clustering implies that periods of high volatility are 
often followed by other periods of high volatility 
and vice versa, is often noticeable in financial 
markets (Engle 1982).  In this paper, I account for 
volatility clustering by introducing a generalized 
autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic model 
(GARCH model) used by many economists to 
account for this phenomenon.  The GARCH model, 
which analyzes what goes into monthly log price 
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changes and takes account for the error variance of 
the model 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖) = ℎ𝑖𝑖. Thus: 
(2) 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝐵𝐵2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 
(3) ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜙𝜙1ℎ𝑖𝑖−1 + ⋯. 
where p represents the monthly log price difference 
and all coefficients are unknown.  The error 
variance of the equation is modeled because the 
variance of the term can be estimated as a function 
of the previous period’s variance, thus implying 
conditional heteroskedasticity.  Conditional 
heteroskedasticity means that the variance of our 
price, over time, can be related to a function of the 
time-period it is in.  For example, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is a function of 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖−1.  In this paper, I develop prices to be a function 
of the monthly log price difference, as seen with 
Mohan et al. (2014) but where I introduce control 
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variables into the regression to account for other 
factors that might influence price changes. (eqns 
3,4)(4) ln (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖) − ln(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖−1) = 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 =  𝐵𝐵0 + 𝐵𝐵1𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖−1 +
𝐵𝐵2𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 
(5)               ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜙𝜙1ℎ𝑖𝑖−1+ 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 
Within this set of regression equations, equation (5) 
is measuring the variance of the error term in (4).  
This set of regressions would estimate the effect of 
climate shocks on the price changes in coffee, and 
also estimates the effect of heteroskedasticity in the 
data. 
VIII. The Contribution of Fair Trade 
 Much of this paper has been dedicated to 
exploring the theme of climate change and its effect 
on the coffee market.  It is noticeable in the coffee 
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market that farmers are susceptible to price 
volatility.  The Fair Trade movement has made a 
claim about climate change that is quite notable and 
well intentioned.  The Fairtrade Foundation, a major 
Fair Trade non-governmental organization (NGO) 
states on its website: 
Given the lack of fairness found within the 
conventional trading system, consumers 
support farmers so they can receive a fair 
price by buying Fairtrade products.  Farmers 
are paid an amount that aims to cover the 
costs of sustainable production, which 
allows them to do future business 
projections.  This is especially important in 
times of instability and volatility, as prices 
can significantly fluctuate. (Fairtrade 
Foundation) 
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This quotation beckons a discussion of what is 
exactly “fair”. After a careful review of the 
literature surrounding Fair Trade, it does not appear 
that the can do much about the price volatility 
effects due to climate shocks.  Fair Trade lacks a 
mechanism to mitigate the price volatility found 
from the effects of climate change. 
 Fair Trade NGOs often only discuss prices 
in policy position papers, pamphlets, and other 
sources.  The biggest fallacy with discussing only 
“fair” prices is that farmers only care about prices, 
instead of income.  Simplistically, income for a 
farmer is price multiplied by quantity.  Mohan 
(2010) observes that “producers are not concerned 
with price per se, but price is important to them to 
the extent that it affects their income”. While it is 
documented that Fair Trade producers do get earn 
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higher incomes according to many studies (Bacon 
2004, Raynolds 2009 and others), Fair Trade cannot 
completely insulate farmers from price volatility 
caused by global climate change and other factors.  
Dragasanu and Nunn (2014) also note that even 
with Fair Trade coffee, no farmer actually sells his 
entire crop as Fair Trade. 
 
In fact, price volatility will probably get 
worse in the coming years with increased variability 
in the climate.  While the efforts by Fair Trade are 
laudable when it comes to sustainability, all coffee 
farmers are still going to be subject to price 
volatility unless the Fair Trade movement creates a 
strong system of income assurances. 
 
IX. Conclusions 
 Overall I find that climate change does 
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indeed affect the coffee market.  Global climate 
change, via droughts and frosts leads to higher price 
volatility for coffee farmers.  The data seem to 
indicate this trend This statistically significant trend 
is noticeable in coffee prices to growers, and 
supports prior research suggesting that global 
climate change will affect commodity producers via 
droughts and frosts.  With increased droughts and 
frosts, there is an increased variability of expected 
returns for coffee farmers, and uncertainty. 
Fair Trade proponents are keen to notice this 
relationship between global climate change and 
coffee price volatility, and it is supported through 
the interviews conducted in Adams County with 
Emilio Garcia and others.  Further research into the 
topic of coffee price volatility would include an 
investigation between the persistence and 
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conditional heteroskedasticity of coffee price 
fluctuations.  While Fair Trade seems to have a lot 
going for it on the charitable side, there is not 
theoretical justification for it preventing volatility or 
insulating farmers from climate related price 
swings. 
There are many policy implications to the 
results of this study.  Agricultural scientists have 
been warning about the potential changes awaiting 
the production of coffee.  This research confirms 
suspicions that droughts and frosts have affected 
volatility.  Thus, volatility is just a catalyst for 
lower farmer welfare as a result of climate change. 
If Fair Trade, as a movement, truly wants to 
mitigate climate change, it would require 
fundamental changes to its models of supporting 
farmers to ensure income stability.  Nevertheless, if 
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Fair Trade coffee is a product that people want, they 
should go ahead and buy it – they just should be 
more weary of its ambitious public statements. 
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